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Abstract 
This commentary questions the argument made in the article, “Demystifying the Influential IS 
Legends of Positivism” (Siponen & Tsohou, 2018). Contrary to the article, this commentary fully 
accepts that logical positivism as a school of thought in the philosophy of science has fallen into 
disrepute, points out that the IS researchers who have characterized positivism in their own ways 
never said that they were following logical positivism, interprets what these researchers had in mind 
when characterizing positivism in the ways that they did, and ponders what difference Siponen and 
Tsohou’s discussion on logical positivism actually makes to the future of IS research. 
Keywords: Positivist Research Methods, Positivism, Logical Positivism, Information Systems 
Philosophy 
Ron Weber was the accepting senior editor. This research commentary was submitted on November 24, 2018, and 
underwent one revision.  
“Demystifying the Influential IS Legends of Positivism” 
(Siponen & Tsohou, 2018) poses the following 
argument: logical positivism as a school of thought in 
the philosophy of science has certain tenets; information 
systems (IS) researchers characterizing positivism 
(namely, Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Klein & Myers, 
1999; Walsham, 1995; Lee, 1991; and Dubé & Paré, 
2003) have run afoul of these tenets; therefore, what 
these IS researchers have characterized as positivist is 
unwarranted. The purpose of this commentary is to 
investigate the validity of Siponen and Tsohou’s 
(S&T’s) conclusion, which is that what certain IS 
researchers have characterized as positivist is 
unwarranted. The purpose of this commentary is not to 
debate the relative merits of positivist and nonpositivist 
forms of research, nor to examine the circumstances in 
which positivist research is likely to be useful or not 
useful, nor to provide a general critique of S&T’s overall 
argument. These (and likely many other additional) 
matters are interesting and important but are not 
germane to the immediate question of whether S&T’s 
conclusion is valid.  Rather, this commentary proceeds 
by pursuing four interrelated questions. First, is logical 
positivism as a school of thought in the philosophy of 
science even legitimate? Second, did the IS researchers 
characterizing positivism themselves say that they 
were following logical positivism? Third, assuming 
that the IS researchers characterizing positivism are 
reasonable people, what did they have in mind when 
characterizing positivism in the ways that they did? 
Fourth, what difference does S&T’s discussion on 
logical positivism actually make to the future of IS 
research? 
First, is logical positivism as a school of thought in 
the philosophy of science even legitimate? Whether 
logical positivism as a school of thought in the 
philosophy of science is even legitimate is a pivotal 
question in this commentary because logical positivism 
forms the basis of S&T’s argument, described above. 
S&T conclude that what certain IS researchers have 
characterized as positivist is unwarranted because these 
researchers’ characterization of positivism does not hew 
to or apply the tenets of logical positivism as a school of 
thought in the philosophy of science. The discrediting of 
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logical positivism, however, renders such a conclusion 
invalid. How may one properly conclude that what 
certain IS researchers have characterized as positivist is 
unwarranted when the yardstick for measuring what is 
warranted—logical positivism—has itself been 
discredited? 
In this commentary, I will take the position that logical 
positivism as a school of thought in the philosophy of 
science has fallen into disrepute. Taking this position, 
however, involves two important qualifications. The 
first qualification has to do with the fact that, on the one 
hand, there is logical positivism as a school of thought 
in the philosophy of science and, on the other hand, there 
is the natural-science and social-science research that 
logical positivism had sought to observe and explain. It 
is only logical positivism as a school of thought in the 
philosophy of science that has been discredited, not the 
natural-science and social-science research that this 
school of thought had sought to observe and explain. 
The second qualification is that  the discrediting of 
logical positivism as a school of thought in the 
philosophy of science also does not discredit any 
research in the IS discipline—including what has been 
labeled positivist IS research—because positivist IS 
research has not followed or implemented the tenets of 
logical positivism as a school of thought in the 
philosophy of science; hence, the discrediting of logical 
positivism has no bearing on the merits of positivist IS 
research. Thus, in taking the position that logical 
positivism as a school of thought in the philosophy of 
science has been discredited, I am not taking the position 
that positivist IS research has been likewise discredited. 
How did logical positivism (the positivism of the Vienna 
Circle) come to be discredited as a school of thought in 
the philosophy of science? Bernstein wrote the 
following in The Restructuring of Social and Political 
Theory (1976, p. 207): 
There is not a single major thesis advanced 
by either nineteenth-century Positivists or 
the Vienna Circle that has not been 
devastatingly criticized when measured by 
the Positivists’ own standards for 
philosophical argument.  The original 
formulations of the analytic-synthetic 
dichotomy and the verifiability criterion of 
meaning have been abandoned.  It has been 
effectively shown that the Positivists’ 
understanding of the natural sciences and 
the formal disciplines is grossly 
oversimplified.  Whatever one’s final 
judgment about the current disputes in the 
post-empiricist philosophy and history of 
science … there is rational agreement about 
the inadequacy of the original Positivist 
understanding of science, knowledge, and 
meaning. 
Rosenberg similarly writes the following about logical 
positivism (2002, pp. 27-28): 
For all its neatness and rigor, the 
Positivists’ program fell apart in the 
immediate postwar period. It did not come 
unstuck through the attacks of its opponents 
and detractors, disgruntled metaphysicians 
who thought that philosophy did provide an 
alternative route to real knowledge that 
science could not reveal. The Positivists’ 
program came apart at the hands of the 
Positivists themselves and of their students. 
They found that its fundamental distinctions 
could not be justified by Positivism’s own 
standards of adequacy. 
This commentary regards the demise of logical 
positivism as a school of thought in the philosophy of 
science to be a fact. Indeed, according to the 
Encyclopedia Britannica (2015): “Interest in logical 
positivism began to wane in the 1950s, and by 1970 it 
had ceased to exist as a distinct philosophical 
movement.” It is important to note that S&T 
acknowledge but underplay the demise of logical 
positivism—indeed, they refer to its “alleged demise” 
(p. 602). In their argument, they return to logical 
positivism as the yardstick against which the 
characterizations of positivism by IS researchers 
should be judged. 
Second, did the IS researchers characterizing 
positivism themselves say that they were following 
logical positivism? It is to their credit, given that 
logical positivism as a school of thought in the 
philosophy of science had fallen into disrepute, that 
none of the IS researchers characterizing positivism 
said that they were following logical positivism. 
Rather, in their papers, they characterized positivism in 
their own ways, and their usage of this term 
(positivism) was consistent with their own 
characterizations. 
I now review characterizations of positivism offered in 
what S&T call “the most influential papers on IS 
positivism.” They identify six such papers. I cover 
those five papers authored by IS researchers. It is 
important to cover all five because they are what S&T 
consider to be the “Influential IS Legends of 
Positivism.”  
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, p. 5) characterized 
positivism as follows:  
Positivist studies are premised on the 
existence of a priori fixed relationships 
within phenomena which are typically 
investigated with structured 
instrumentation. Such studies serve 
primarily to test theory, in an attempt to 
increase predictive understanding of 




phenomena. The criteria we adopted in 
classifying studies as positivist were 
evidence of formal propositions, 
quantifiable measures of variables, 
hypotheses testing, and the drawing of 
inferences about a phenomenon from the 
sample to a stated population. 
Klein and Myers (1999, p. 69) based their own 
characterization of “positivist” on Orlikowski and 
Baroudi:  
Generally speaking, IS research can be 
classified as positivist if there is evidence of 
formal propositions, quantifiable measures 
of variables, hypothesis testing, and the 
drawing of inferences about a phenomenon 
from a representative sample to a stated 
population (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). 
Examples of a positivist approach to 
qualitative research include Yin’s (1994) 
and Benbasat et al.’s (1987) work on case 
study research. 
Walsham (1995, p. 383), in his characterization of 
positivism, also relied on Orlikowski and Baroudi:  
The criteria used by Orlikowski and 
Baroudi (1991) to distinguish between 
positivist and interpretive articles form a 
good starting point for the discussion here. 
Positivist articles were identified on the 
basis of evidence of formal propositions, 
quantifiable measures of variables, the use 
of hypothesis testing, and the drawing of 
inferences about phenomena from a sample 
to a stated population. 
Lee (1991, pp. 343-344) noted the philosophical 
origins of positivism (“the positivist approach to 
organizational research puts into practice a view of 
science that has its origins in a school of thought within 
the philosophy of science known as ‘logical 
positivism’ or ‘logical empiricism’”), but then 
explicitly advanced his own characterization of the 
positivist approach:  
In a nutshell, the positivist approach 
involves the manipulation of theoretical 
propositions using the rules of formal logic 
and the rules of hypothetico-deductive 
logic, so that the theoretical propositions 
satisfy the four requirements of 
falsifiability, logical consistency, relative 
explanatory power, and survival. 
Immediately following are the details to this 
outline. 
Dubé and Paré (2003, p. 604) offered their own criteria 
for classifying a case article as positivist:  
Specifically, the primary criteria for 
classifying a theoretically grounded case 
article as positivist were the following: 
• adoption of a positivist perspective 
clearly stated in the study 
• evidence of formal research hypotheses 
or propositions 
• evidence of qualitative and/or 
quantitative measures of variables or 
constructs 
• explicit purpose of theory testing or 
theory building 
• concern for validity and reliability 
issues as used in the natural sciences 
In none of the five papers did the authors state that they 
were defining positivism in the way that logical 
positivism in the philosophy of science did. Rather, 
each paper was explicit in providing its own definition. 
To be critical of the papers’ authors for not hewing to 
and applying logical positivist conceptions would 
therefore be misplaced. 
A point worth emphasizing is the absence of any 
mention, in the above five papers, of the tenets of 
logical positivism as a school of thought in the 
philosophy of science. In particular, S&T write (p. 
601): “the most well-known theses of LP [are] … (1) 
analytic/synthetic knowledge, and (2) a verifiable [sic] 
criterion of meaning”; however, neither of these two 
most well-known theses of logical positivism (the 
analytic-synthetic dichotomy and the verifiability 
criterion of meaning) is mentioned in any of the five 
papers. Because of this, what is considered positivism 
in IS research is different from logical positivism as a 
school of thought in the philosophy of science. The five 
papers offered their own characterizations of 
positivism independently of what logical positivism in 
philosophy characterized as positivist. In other words, 
there is no evidence that the IS researchers who 
authored the five papers stated that they were adopting 
logical positivism. 
Another point worth making explicit is that none of the 
five papers above rejected or otherwise denigrated 
positivism. All were accepting of the value of positivist 
research. In fact, two of the papers even explained how 
a positivist methodology can be productively followed 
(where Lee, 1991, showed how positivist and 
interpretive methodologies can be compatible in the 
same study, and Dubé and Paré, 2003, delineated how 
a positivist methodology can be followed in a 
qualitative case study). A related point is that, in these 
five papers, there is no hint of a civil war between 
positivist and nonpositivist forms of research in IS; in 
this commentary, no stand is taken or needs to be taken 
on the relative merits of positivist and nonpositivist 
forms of IS research.   
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Now, how is it possible that the IS researchers who 
authored the five papers still called a given perspective 
“positivism,” but did not adopt the tenets of logical 
positivism? The hermeneutics of Ricoeur (1973) 
suggest an answer. In a face-to-face discourse, a 
speaker can engage in a back-and-forth with a listener 
in order to ensure that the latter understands what the 
former means. However, “with written discourse,” the 
two parties (now, the author and the reader) are no 
longer co-present, and as a result, “the author’s 
intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide” 
(p. 95). Ricoeur elaborates (p. 95): 
…the text’s career escapes the finite horizon 
of its author. What the text says now matters 
more than what the author meant to say, 
and every exegesis [by a reader] unfolds its 
procedures within the circumference of a 
meaning that has broken its moorings to the 
psychology of its author. 
In other words, the authors of the term “logical 
positivism” may very well have meant certain things 
by it (for Ricoeur, this is “the author’s intention”), but 
then, what “logical positivism” or simply “positivism” 
came to mean for its readers was different from that 
which the authors intended (for Ricoeur, this is “every 
exegesis [by a reader] unfolds its procedures within the 
circumference of a meaning that has broken its 
moorings to the psychology of its author”). Then, these 
readers in turn become authors with their own 
intentions and meanings behind the term “positivism”; 
thus, what this term comes to mean for new readers can 
be different from what its authors intended. Over 
several generations of scholarship, therefore, the 
original intentions or meaning behind “logical 
positivism” may be lost. Therefore, it becomes 
possible for the authors of the five papers quoted above 
to characterize “positivism” without any mention of its 
two original, most well-known theses or, indeed, any 
of its theses. And it also becomes possible for the 
authors of the five papers to refer to their perspective 
not by its original name, “logical positivism,” but by a 
different name, “positivism.” 
Third, assuming that the IS researchers 
characterizing positivism are reasonable people, 
what did they have in mind when characterizing 
positivism in the ways that they did? According to 
one interpretation, IS researchers have not had as their 
main purpose the endeavor to apply any existing 
philosophy (such as logical positivism); instead, as 
their main purpose, IS researchers have simply 
endeavored to do and publish IS research. In the 1980s, 
the ability of qualitative and interpretive IS researchers 
to publish their research was largely overshadowed and 
often oppressed by another form of research, which 
they labeled “positivist.” It is important to interpret IS 
researchers in this context.  It was in this context that 
much of what IS researchers considered to be positivist 
was largely shaped—and it was apparently shaped 
more so by what IS researchers observed to be going 
on in IS research than, if at all, in the philosophy of 
science. This explains the characterizations of 
positivism as involving stable independent and 
dependent variables, survey research, statistics, 
generalizability, and so forth. These were 
characterizations of a stream of research in IS that IS 
researchers chose to name “positivist.” 
According to this interpretation, these IS researchers 
were shaping a conception of positivism based on a 
reading of what was going on in IS research rather than 
a reading or misreading of logical positivism in the 
philosophy of science. In giving the dominant stream 
of IS research a name (positivism) and thereby 
designating it as only one form of research, these IS 
researchers then opened the door to other forms of 
research, such as interpretive research (and, much later, 
design science research). In other words, just as some 
philosophers of science had chosen to characterize 
some features of natural-science and social-science 
research as positivist, IS researchers have chosen to 
characterize some features of IS research as positivist. 
There is no reason that the IS characterizations of 
positivism need to be identical to the philosophical 
characterizations of positivism.  
Fourth, what difference does Siponen and Tsohou’s 
discussion on logical positivism actually make to the 
future of IS research? S&T state: “Realizing that 
certain influential, taken-for-granted assumptions 
underlying IS research are unwarranted, could have 
ground-breaking implications for future IS research.” 
In S&T’s view, for certain assumptions underlying IS 
research to be warranted would mean that they must be 
aligned with logical positivism as a school of thought 
in the philosophy of science, but given its discredited 
status, any such groundbreaking implications would 
not be constructive. In other words, because of the 
invalidity of S&T’s conclusion (which is that what 
certain IS researchers have characterized as positivist 
is unwarranted), it would be best for S&T’s discussion 
not to make a difference to the future of IS research. 
What researchers do is itself a form of the social 
construction of reality. Positivist IS research is what 
positivist IS researchers do and some IS researchers 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Klein & Myers, 1999; 
Walsham, 1995; Lee, 1991; and Dubé & Paré, 2003) 
have offered accounts of this social construction being 
undertaken by positivist IS researchers. In the activity 
of the social construction of their research, these 
positivist IS researchers have been busy in their 
activities that involve such elements as independent 
and dependent variables, survey research, statistics, 
generalizability, and so forth, which is different from 
the activity of positing the tenets of the discredited 
philosophy of logical positivism and deductively 
applying these tenets in their research. In this regard, 




S&T’s discussion on logical positivism need not and 
should not make a difference to the future of IS 
research. 
Assuming that S&T are reasonable people, what did 
they have in mind when they concluded that what 
certain IS researchers (in particular, Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991; Klein & Myers, 1999; Walsham, 1995; 
Lee, 1991; and Dubé & Paré, 2003) have characterized 
as positivist is unwarranted? One interpretation is that 
S&T began with the premise that positivism had 
certain tenets (namely, the tenets of logical positivism 
as a school of thought in the philosophy of science, 
which include the analytic-synthetic dichotomy and 
the verifiability criterion of meaning). They observed 
that these tenets did not coincide with those in the IS 
researchers’ characterizations of positivism; therefore, 
within this framework of reasoning, they rightly 
concluded that what these IS researchers characterized 
as positivist is unwarranted. 
What S&T’s framework excluded, however, is the 
possibility of the existence of any forms of positivism 
other than logical positivism—namely, the forms that 
evolved from logical positivism in the manner 
suggested by Ricoeur and that were articulated by 
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Klein & Myers, 1999; 
Walsham, 1995; Lee, 1991; and Dubé & Paré, 2003. 
S&T’s exclusion of other forms of positivism from 
their consideration allowed them to conclude, 
incorrectly, that what certain IS researchers have 
characterized as positivist is unwarranted. 
In conclusion, it is correct that IS researchers 
characterizing positivism have run afoul of the tenets 
of logical positivism, but it is not correct that what 
these IS researchers have characterized as positivist is 
unwarranted. Logical positivism does not hold a 
monopoly on what positivism is. There are conceptions 
of positivism outside of logical positivism—for 
instance, legal positivism and, as discussed above, IS 
positivism. Positivist research, as defined by IS 
researchers, is very much alive in IS. IS researchers 
should feel free to continue to characterize positivism 
in ways that they consider to be useful to them.
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